Lectures (Video)
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Putting yourselves into other people's shoes
- 3. Iterative deletion and the median-voter theorem
- 4. Best responses in soccer and business partnerships
- 5. Nash equilibrium: bad fashion and bank runs
- 6. Nash equilibrium: dating and Cournot
- 7. Nash equilibrium: shopping, standing and voting on a line
- 8. Nash equilibrium: location, segregation and randomization
- 9. Mixed strategies in theory and tennis
- 10. Mixed strategies in baseball, dating and paying your taxes
- 11. Evolutionary stability: cooperation, mutation, and equilibrium
- 12. Evolutionary stability: social convention, aggression, and cycles
- 13. Sequential games: moral hazard, incentives, and hungry lions
- 14. Backward induction: commitment, spies, and first-mover
- 15. Backward induction: chess, strategies, and credible threats
- 16. Backward induction: reputation and duels
- 17. Backward induction: ultimatums and bargaining
- 18. Imperfect information: information sets and sub-game
- 19. Subgame perfect equilibrium: matchmaking and strategic investments
- 20. Subgame perfect equilibrium: wars of attrition
- 21. Repeated games: cooperation vs. the end game
- 22. Repeated games: cheating, punishment, and outsourcing
- 23. Asymmetric information: silence, signaling and suffering education
- 24. Asymmetric information: auctions and the winner's curse
Game Theory - Lecture 19
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Lecture 19 - Subgame perfect equilibrium: matchmaking and strategic investments
We analyze three games using our new solution concept, subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). The first game involves players' trusting that others will not make mistakes. It has three Nash equilibria but only one is consistent with backward induction. We show the other two Nash equilibria are not subgame perfect: each fails to induce Nash in a subgame. The second game involves a matchmaker sending a couple on a date. There are three Nash equilibria in the dating subgame. We construct three corresponding subgame perfect equilibria of the whole game by rolling back each of the equilibrium payoffs from the subgame. Finally, we analyze a game in which a firm has to decide whether to invest in a machine that will reduce its costs of production. We learn that the strategic effects of this decision--its effect on the choices of other competing firms--can be large, and if we ignore them we will make mistakes.
Prof. Ben Polak
ECON 159 Game Theory, Fall 2007 (Yale University: Open Yale) http://oyc.yale.edu Date accessed: 2009-01-15 License: Creative Commons BY-NC-SA |
Lecture Material
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